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Can formal contracts help resolving the holdup problem? We address this important question 
by studying the holdup problem in repeated transactions between a seller and a buyer in 
which the seller can make relation-specific investments in each period. In contrast to previous 
findings, we demonstrate that writing a simple fixed-price contract based on product delivery 
is of value even when relation-specific investment is purely cooperative. In particular, there is 
a range of parameter values in which a higher investment can be implemented only if a formal 
fixed-price contract is written and combined with an informal agreement on additional 
payments or termination of future trade, contingent upon investments. Furthermore, we show 
that under an additional natural assumption, focusing our attention on fixed-price contracts as 
a form of formal contracts is without loss of generality. The key driving force of our result is 
a possibility that the threat-point effect is negative, i.e., the relation-specific investment 
decreases the surplus under no trade. This possibility, although very plausible, has been 
largely ignored in previous theoretical/empirical analyses of the holdup problem. 
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Relation-speciﬁc investments often cause holdup problems when contracting is incomplete.
Suppose, as an example, that a seller has an opportunity to make an investment which
creates more value inside its relationship to a particular buyer than outside. The relation-
speciﬁc nature of the investment may result in the buyer’s opportunistic behavior. Contracts
contingent upon investment-related information could protect the seller, but this is often
diﬃcult in reality. So, without adequate contractual protection, the seller’s anticipation of
the buyer’s opportunistic behavior results in a less than socially optimal level of investment.
The holdup problem has played a central role in the economic analysis of organizations
and institutions, and many authors have proposed various organizational interventions, such
as vertical integration (Klein et al., 1978; Williamson, 1985), as remedies to the problem. In
the holdup literature, a fundamental driving force of the ineﬃciency has been the assumption
that contracts contingent upon the nature of relation-speciﬁc investments are infeasible, which
is a realistic assumption in a wide variety of real-world bilateral trade. At the same time,
the courts can often verify delivery of the goods by the seller, and hence formal ﬁxed-price
contracts based on product delivery are often feasible. More general formal contracts that
may be contingent upon the parties’ messages (i.e., reports on the state) should also be
considered.
Can formal contracts help resolving or mitigating the holdup problem? Edlin and Reichel-
stein (1996) and Che and Hausch (1999) have made signiﬁcant contributions in addressing
this important question. Edlin and Reichelstein showed that the answer is yes by demonstrat-
ing that a well-designed ﬁxed-price contract can give the seller eﬃcient investment incentives,
where they focus on “selﬁsh” investments that beneﬁted the investor (e.g., the seller’s in-
vestment reduces his/her production costs). Che and Hausch has shown that the answer
to this question becomes very diﬀerent for “cooperative” investments (e.g., the seller’s in-
vestment improves the buyer’s value of the good). They found, among other things, that
formal contracts have no values when investments are purely cooperative (that is, the seller’s
investment beneﬁts the buyer only, and the buyer’s investment beneﬁts the seller only). See
Section 2 for more details on these papers.
We demonstrate that formal contracts can help mitigating the holdup problem even
when relation-speciﬁc investment is purely cooperative, by incorporating two key ingredients
in our model. The ﬁrst ingredient concerns the eﬀect of relation-speciﬁc investments on
the surplus under no trade. We call this eﬀect the “threat-point eﬀect”, following Edlin
and Hermalin (2000). Most previous contracting models in the holdup literature, including
Edlin and Reichelstein (1996) and Che and Hausch (1999), assume that relation-speciﬁc
1investment has no threat-point eﬀects. In contrast, relation-speciﬁc investment does have
threat-point eﬀects in most property rights models (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and
Moore, 1990; Hart, 1995). In our model, the threat-point eﬀect can be positive or negative.
That is, relation-speciﬁc investment may reduce the surplus under no trade, as pointed out,
for example, by Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Edlin and Hermalin (2000). Concerning
physical asset speciﬁcity, Rajan and Zingales (1998) pointed out, “The specialization of an
asset implies almost by deﬁnition a reduction in the outside value of that asset” (p.408). Iyer
and Schoar (2008) used custom-printed lots of pens as an example of the negative threat-
point eﬀect in their recent ﬁeld experiment regarding the holdup problem. A speciﬁc logo
(e.g. company logo) printed on the pens increases the value of the pens for a speciﬁc buyer.
However, it may decrease the surplus under no trade because, in order to sell the pens to
alternative buyers, the seller may have to remove the logo by incurring adjustment costs.
A similar idea is incorporated in Hart (1995)’s model, where he argues that, once a seller
has made relation-speciﬁc investment, the seller will have to make some adjustments to turn
its product into a general-purpose one before selling it to alternative buyers (Hart, 1995,
p.36).1 See, for example, Andrabi et al. (2006) and Banerjee and Basu (2009) for recent
theoretical analyses that incorporate the idea that relation-speciﬁc investment decreases the
surplus under no trade.2
The second ingredient is repeated transactions between a seller and a buyer. In reality,
relation-speciﬁc investments are often made under long-term and repeated interaction be-
tween parties. Coase (1988) pointed out that A.O. Smith, a large independent manufacturer
1In Hart (1995)’s model, a seller’s relation-speciﬁc investment aﬀects the seller’s cost. In particular, the
seller’s cost to produce a widget for a speciﬁc buyer is C(e) and the production cost is c(e;B) for alternative
buyers, where e denotes the level of the seller’s relation-speciﬁc investment. Hart assumes that the investment
e is more eﬀective for C(e)t h a nf o rc(e;B) because, “If trade does not occur, [the seller] will sell her widget on
the competitive spot market for ¯ p, but will have to make some adjustments to turn it into a general-purpose
widget. (p.36)” In his model, relation-speciﬁc investment increases the surplus under no trade, because it
assumes that c(e;B)i sd e c r e a s i n gi ne. This, however, may not necessarily be the case. If adjustment costs
are substantially high and increasing in e, c(e;B) can also be increasing in e, implying that relation-speciﬁc
investment decreases the surplus under no trade.
2Also, even if relation-speciﬁc investment itself does not decrease the surplus under no trade, it may still
end up decreasing the surplus under no trade if relation-speciﬁc investment and general-purpose investments
are substitutes for investors. For example, consider a seller who can make two kinds of investments, a
relation-speciﬁc investment (zero or one unit) that increases the value of its product only for a speciﬁc buyer,
and a general-purpose investment (zero or one unit) that increases the value of its product for all potential
buyers. If the seller can make only one unit of investment because of various resource constraints, then the
seller’s relation-speciﬁc investment reduces the surplus under no trade by preventing itself from making the
general-purpose investment. See Cai (2003) who studies such a multi-dimensional investment model in which
increasing relation-speciﬁc investment reduces general-purpose investment and hence reduces the outside value.
This idea can be applied, among other things, to human asset speciﬁcity: If a worker can spend only one hour
per day for training, spending the limited time for acquiring skills speciﬁc to his employer could reduce the
surplus under no trade by preventing him from acquiring general skills that are also applicable to some other
potential employers.
2of automobile frames, had invested in expensive equipment that was highly speciﬁc to its
main customer, such as General Motors, for more than 50 years. Also, Coase (2000) found
that prior to the acquisition of Fisher Body by General Motors in 1926, Fisher Body had
repeatedly made location-speciﬁc investments for General Motors. According to Holmstr¨ om
and Roberts (1998, p.83), “Nucor [the most successful steel maker in the United States over
the past 20 years] decided to make a single ﬁrm, the David J. Joseph Company (DJJ), its
sole supplier of scrap. Total dependence on a single supplier would seem to carry signiﬁcant
hold-up risks, but for more than a decade, this relationship has been working smoothly and
successfully.”
Despite the important connection between relation-speciﬁc investments and long-term
relationships, there have been very few theoretical analyses, to the best of our knowledge,
that have addressed the holdup problem under inﬁnitely repeated interactions.3 Edlin and
Reichelstein (1996) and Che and Hausch (1999), for example, both focus on spot transac-
tions. This might be because, due to a reasoning based on the Folk Theorem, the holdup
problem can obviously be resolved under inﬁnitely repeated interactions if the discount factor
is high enough. We show, however, that when the discount factor is not high enough, formal
contracts can play a crucial role in resolving the holdup problem under repeated transactions
when relation-speciﬁc investment is purely cooperative and decreases the surplus under no
trade.
Cooperative investments play important roles in reality. Let us consider manufacturer-
supplier relationships in the Japanese automobile industry as an example. A common practice
in the Japanese automobile industry is that the supplier does the actual design of the cus-
tomized parts based on functional speciﬁcations provided by the manufacturer. These parts
are called the “drawing approved” parts by Asanuma (1989, 1992), and the “black-box”
parts by Fujimoto (1999). Asanuma (1989, 1992) observed that, in order to complete the
design successfully, the supplier should have equipment to design, manufacture, and test trial
parts, and the ability to understand and ﬁnely adapt to the subtle needs of the manufacturer.
Consequently, suppliers need to make a substantial amount of relation-speciﬁc investments.
Fujimoto (1999) emphasizes the importance of “bundled outsourcing” behind this practice,
meaning that a bundle of functionally related tasks like machining and assembly, detailed
engineering and manufacturing, or production and inspection, is subcontracted out to one
3Several recent papers introduced dynamic structures into the analysis of the holdup problem. Gul (2001)
studied repeated oﬀers, Che and S´ akovics (2004) allowed parties to continue to invest until they agree on the
terms of trade, and Pitchford and Snyder (2004) also studied the holdup problem involving gradual investment.
Watson (2007) examined a contracting model in which veriﬁable productive actions take place over multiple
(ﬁnite) periods of time, following unveriﬁable one-shot investment. See also Watson and Wignall (2009) for
a related analysis. None of these papers, however, studied the holdup problem under inﬁnitely repeated
interactions.
3supplier as a package. He argues that this practice results in asset speciﬁcity and facilitates
long-term relational transactions. Regarding Japanese automakers’ relationships with their
partner suppliers, Dyer (1996) found that on average 30.6% of the supplier’s total capital
equipment investments is valuable only for a particular manufacturer (“not redeployable”).4
Dyer also found that the average number of “guest” engineers sent by partner suppliers to
automakers is 7.2, where guest engineers become a part of the design team and are co-located
with automaker engineers. These investments in physical asset and human capital are co-
operative relation-speciﬁc investments because suppliers make these investments in order to
improve their abilities to meet functional requirements of the customized parts for particular
manufacturers.5
According to Asanuma’s observations, parts that require a high degree of cooperative
relation-speciﬁc investments tend to be transacted under repeated bilateral interactions be-
tween an automaker and a single supplier, where investments are made on a recurring basis
because automakers periodically introduce new models. The supplier’s costs for designing
customized parts are to be recovered through the sale price of the parts, where prices are
not speciﬁed in formal contracts but determined through negotiations on a regular basis
(Holmstrom and Roberts, 1998). That is, formal price contracts are not utilized to induce
relation-speciﬁc investments under repeated transactions in the context of manufacturer-
supplier relationships in the Japanese automobile industry. The supplier’s contributions
to improvements in quality, design, and cost reduction aﬀect its ratings by the assembler,
and better ratings are rewarded in future transactions through “promotion” to more favor-
able/challenging assignments.6 Formal price contracts, however, are often utilized in similar
setups in diﬀerent cases. For example, Crocker and Reynolds (1993) studied several kinds of
formal price contracts in defense procurement of the U.S. Air Force, where “By its nature,
defense acquisition involves substantial recurring investment in relationship-speciﬁc assets by
a relatively small group of highly specialized defense contracts.”7
Under what conditions can formal contracts help to induce relation-speciﬁc investments
under repeated transactions? Our theoretical analysis identiﬁes the threat-point eﬀect as a
critical factor to be considered for cooperative investments, where formal contacts are not
4Dyer studied two Japanese and three U.S. automakers. Each automaker purchasing department manager
selected a sample of 50 domestic supplier relationships. In selecting this sample, each automaker was asked to
select a sample of 25 “supplier partners with whom you work most closely” and a sample of 25 “most typical
arms-length supplier relationships.”
5See Che and Hausch (1999) for several other real-world examples for cooperative investments.
6See Nishiguchi (1994) and Fujimoto (1999) for other evidences and observations.
7In his well-known study of coal markets, Joskow (1985, 1987) examined the eﬀects of relation-speciﬁc
investment on the duration of contracts negotiated between electric utilities and coal suppliers. The focus
here is site speciﬁc investment, which is not recurring investment by its nature.
4useful if the threat-point eﬀect is positive whereas formal contracts can be useful if the eﬀect
is negative and the holdup eﬀect is suﬃciently large. We therefore suggest that the threat-
point eﬀect be incorporated in empirical studies on formal contracts and relation-speciﬁc
investments under repeated transactions.
We consider a standard setup of the holdup problem in which a buyer purchases 0 or 1
units of a product from a seller. The seller chooses an action a, that can be interpreted as
a level of relation-speciﬁc investment, by incurring private costs. The investment increases
the product’s value for the buyer, but has no eﬀects on the seller’s production cost. That is,
the investment is purely cooperative. A formal contract can be signed prior to the seller’s
investment decision.8 After the investment is made, some state uncertainty, denoted θ,i s
revealed and observed. The buyer and the seller are then free to (re)negotiate the price with
exogenously speciﬁed bargaining power, whether or not formal contracts have been signed.
Let ρ(a,θ) denote the negotiation price in the absence of formal contracts. Unlike most
previous models considered in the holdup literature, our model allows for the possibility that
relation-speciﬁc investment decreases the surplus under no trade, and this in turn implies
that ρ(a,θ) can be decreasing in a.
We ﬁrst study the value of formal contracts under spot transaction. We ﬁnd that formal
contracts, even if we allow contracts to be contingent on messages, are of no value in resolving
or mitigating the holdup problem under an assumption that ρ(a,θ) is either weakly increasing
or weakly decreasing in a for all realizations of uncertainty θ. Although we believe that this
is a natural assumption, implying that the eﬀects of uncertainty θ be not too large to alter
the sign of the eﬀects of investment a on the negotiated price, our contribution actually does
not rely on it: If this assumption does not hold, formal contracts can be of value even under
spot transaction in our model.9 In other words, this is a conservative assumption in our
attempt to show that formal contracts are of value in resolving the holdup problem even
when relation-speciﬁc investment is purely cooperative.
Next we consider repeated transactions, and ﬁnd that formal contracts can help resolving
or mitigating the holdup problem even under the conservative assumption mentioned above.
Furthermore, we ﬁnd that it is without loss of generality to conﬁne our attention to formal
ﬁxed-price contracts. That is, whenever a simple ﬁxed-price contract can help to resolve or
mitigate the holdup problem, the parties cannot get strictly better oﬀ by signing a more
complex contract that is contingent upon messages. We then show that the qualitative
nature of our results remains unchanged under an extension of our model that allows multiple
8The contract can be a simple ﬁxed-price contract based on product delivery or a more complex contract
contingent upon the parties’ reports on the investment and the state.
9Formal ﬁxed-price contracts may not be of value without this assumption. However, more complex
contracts contingent upon the parties’ reports on the state can be of value under spot transaction.
5quantities (rather than 0 or 1) to be transacted between the seller and the buyer.
Below we illustrate the logic behind our main ﬁndings by using a simpler version of our
model in which (i) the level of the seller’s investment a is either a = 0 (“do not invest”) or 1
(“invest”) and the cost for the investment is d>0, (ii) the buyer has the entire bargaining
power (that is, the buyer can make a take-it-or-leave-it price oﬀer to the seller), and (iii)
there is no uncertainty. We focus on simple ﬁxed-price contracts as the form of formal
contracts. Our analysis on more general versions of the model indicates that it is without
loss of generality to conﬁne our attention on ﬁxed-price contracts in this simpler version of
the model.
Let va ≥ 0 be the value for the buyer and ma ≥ 0 the alternative-use value under
investment level a =0 ,1, where v1 − v0 > 0 holds. As mentioned above, the threat-point
eﬀect may be positive (i.e. m1 − m0 ≥ 0) or negative (i.e. m1 − m0 < 0) in our model.
Assume (i) v1 >m 1; (ii) v1 − v0 >v 1 − m0 >d ; and (iii) m1 − m0 <d . The ﬁrst two
assumptions imply that investment and trade are the eﬃcient outcome while no trade is
ex post eﬃcient under no investment (m0 >v 0). The third assumption implies that no
investment is eﬃcient if they do not trade, and we will see below that the same assumption
will also imply “under-investment” under spot transaction.
Under spot transaction without formal contracts, the buyer’s take-it-or-leave-it price oﬀer
is ma if investment level is a =0 ,1. Since m0 − (m1 − d)=−(m1 − m0)+d>0, the seller
chooses not to invest (under-investment). By our assumption m0 >v 0, no trade occurs and
the seller obtains the alternative-use value m0. The seller would choose to invest if the buyer
could commit to cover the investment cost d by paying m0 + d contingent upon investment.
Such contingent price contracts, however, are often infeasible in reality, and hence we assume
that they are not possible in our model. Simple ﬁxed-price contracts are not helpful under
spot transactions. This is because, under non-contingent ﬁxed-price contracts, the buyer
virtually commits herself to paying the same price whether or not the investment is made,
and hence the seller chooses not to invest.
Now consider repeated transactions. Suppose that the buyer informally promises to pay
m0 +d contingent upon investment. The seller does invest, if it is anticipated that the buyer
keeps the promise. But, once the seller invests, the buyer has a temptation to renege on the
implicit promise and purchase the product at the price m1. The buyer’s reneging temptation
is (m0 + d) − m1 = d +( m0 − m1) > 0. Suppose the threat-point eﬀect is negative so that
m0−m1 > 0 holds. Then, a simple ﬁxed-price contract eliminates m0−m1 from the reneging
temptation, because, under such a contract, the buyer credibly commits to pay a ﬁxed price
regardless of the level of investment. Under the same reasoning, however, the seller would
choose not to invest under the ﬁxed-price contract. Therefore, in order to induce the seller to
6invest, the buyer needs to combine the ﬁxed-price contract p = m0 with an implicit promise
of covering the investment cost d as a bonus. The buyer’s temptation to renege on this
implicit promise is d, which is less than d +( m0 − m1).
Hence, a formal ﬁxed-price contract combined with an implicit bonus can help mitigating
the holdup problem by reducing the buyer’s reneging temptation under repeated transactions.
Similar basic logic carries over into more general versions of the model as we show in later
sections. In this example, it is optimal for the buyer to promise to pay a bonus since she
then need not leave a rent to the seller. However, a formal ﬁxed-price contract along with a
termination scheme in which the buyer terminates to trade with the seller if the latter does
not invest is equally eﬀective in mitigating the holdup problem. See Section 4 for details.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 relates the present paper to the
existing literature. Section 3 presents our base model in which a buyer purchases 0 or 1 units
of a product from a seller, and Section 4 analyzes the model. Section 5 explores an extension
of the model that allows multiple quantities to be transacted, and Section 6 oﬀers concluding
remarks.
2 Relationship to the Literature
In this section we discuss the relationship between our paper and the existing theoretical
literature, and also our contribution to the empirical literature on the relationship between
relational governance and formal contracts. We identify three sets of theoretical literature
that are related to our work: (i) literature analyzing whether simple formal contracts resolve
or mitigate the holdup problem under spot transactions; (ii) property rights literature that
analyzes the threat-point eﬀect under spot transactions; and (iii) literature on relational
contracting and its interaction with formal contracts and institutions.
Let us begin with the ﬁrst set of theoretical literature. Edlin and Reichelstein (1996)
considered a bilateral trade relationship in which the seller and the buyer can write a simple
contract specifying a ﬁxed trade price and quantity at a future date. The seller then decides
how much to invest in a relation-speciﬁc asset that lowers the subsequent cost of producing
the good. After the investment is made, the buyer and the seller are free to renegotiate the
contract with exogenously speciﬁed bargaining power. Edlin and Reichelstein found that a
well-designed ﬁxed-price contract can give the seller eﬃcient investment incentives.
Che and Hausch (1999) pointed out that these previous studies were limited by their
restriction on the nature of the relation-speciﬁc investments; that is, these studies focused on
“selﬁsh” investments that beneﬁted the investor (e.g., the seller’s investment reduces his/her
production costs). Che and Hausch convincingly argued through a number of real-world
7examples that “cooperative” investments (e.g., the seller’s investment improves the buyer’s
value of the good) were equally important, although cooperative investments had received
little attention in the literature.
Che and Hausch’s results for cooperative investments, which, as we discussed in Intro-
duction, serve as the starting point of our work, are very diﬀerent from those of Edlin and
Reichelstein for selﬁsh investments although they considered a bilateral trade relationship
similar to the one analyzed by Edlin and Reichelstein: Che and Hausch showed that if in-
vestments are suﬃciently cooperative and a commitment not to renegotiate is impossible for
the parties, there exists an intermediate range of bargaining shares for which contracting
has no value, i.e., contracting oﬀers the parties no advantages over ex post negotiation. In
particular, contracting has no value for any parameter range if both investments are purely
cooperative (that is, the seller’s investment beneﬁts the buyer only, and the buyer’s invest-
ment beneﬁts the seller only).
Several papers argue that the ﬁrst-best (eﬃcient) purely cooperative investment by the
seller can be induced even under spot transactions. MacLeod and Malcomson (1993), the
very ﬁrst paper studying cooperative investment, show the eﬃciency result when the outside
option principle applies to enable the seller to obtain all the returns from investment. Lyon
and Rasmusen (2004) point out that if the buyer always has a ﬁnal opportunity to exercise her
option and there is no discounting, then the seller can obtain all the returns from investment
by refusing to renegotiate, and show that a buyer-option contract implements the ﬁrst-best
cooperative investment.10
Che and Chung (1999) and Schweizer (2006) show that the ﬁrst-best investment can be
induced under particular breach remedies which require that investments be observed by the
court. Stremitzer (2010) shows that simple contracts specifying required “quality” (a thresh-
old value to the buyer) can induce the seller’s ﬁrst-best investment if the court can observe
the realized value to the buyer. Note that the eﬃciency results by Che and Chung (1999),
Schweizer (2006), and Stremitzer (2010) require the court to observe more information than
that assumed in Che and Hausch (1999) where no investment-related information (including
the value to the buyer) is contractible and hence none of the standard breach remedies is
available except for speciﬁc performance.11
10Wickelgren (2006) however argues that this conclusion is sensitive to the renegotiation bargaining struc-
ture. He shows that the holdup problem reappears if the parties discount the future and renegotiation
continues for suﬃciently long periods.
11Stremitzer (2010) also shows that the ﬁrst-best investment can be attained by a contract with lower
informational requirements that the court only need observe whether the realized value to the buyer lies
above or below the threshold level speciﬁed in the contract. Furthermore, he argues that this contract can
be implemented in the informational environment of Che and Hausch (1999) because they assume that the
court can observe whether or not trade has occurred, which implies that the court can verify whether the
8Our paper contributes to this literature by analyzing roles of formal contracts in resolving
or mitigating the holdup problem under repeated transactions in the presence of the threat-
point eﬀect. In contrast to MacLeod and Malcomson (1993) and Lyon and Rasmusen (2004),
we follow Edlin and Reichelstein (1996) and Che and Hausch (1999) by assuming exogenously
speciﬁed surplus sharing in renegotiation.12 And to be comparable to Che and Hausch (1999),
throughout the paper we adopt the same informational requirements for enforcement as Che
and Hausch (1999).13 Hence in our base model the seller cannot be induced to choose the
ﬁrst-best cooperative investment under spot transactions.
All the papers mentioned above, including Edlin and Reichelstein (1996) and Che and
Hausch (1999), assume that the seller’s investment has no eﬀect on the surplus under no
trade.14 In contrast to the ﬁrst set of literature, the second set, which is the literature on the
property rights theory originating from Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990),
and Hart (1995), assumes that the parties’ investments on an asset aﬀect the asset owner’s
payoﬀ under no trade. Edlin and Hermalin (2000) call this the threat-point eﬀect. Besides
the analysis of the threat-point eﬀect, some of the recent literature following this theory is
particularly relevant to our work in that cooperative investments are analyzed (Edlin and
Hermalin, 2000; N¨ oldeke and Schmidt, 1998; Segal and Whinston, 2000) and the possibility
of the negative threat-point eﬀect (the seller’s investment reduces his payoﬀ at the threat
point) is studied (Edlin and Hermalin, 2000; Rajan and Zingales, 1998). However, diﬀerent
from our model, this set of literature adopts the incomplete contract setting where formal
contracts contingent on terms of trade, in particular, quantities, are infeasible.15 Hence, roles
of formal contracts are not explored in this literature.
Regarding the third set of theoretical literature, our analysis of informal agreements builds
on a general analysis of relational contracts by MacLeod and Malcomson (1989) and Levin
(2003). Baker et al. (1994), Schmidt and Schnitzer (1995), Pearce and Stacchetti (1998),
and Kvaløy and Olsen (2009) study how formal contracting aﬀects the self-enforceability of
informal agreements. These papers do not, however, analyze the holdup problem caused by
the relation-speciﬁc nature of investments and incompleteness of contracting in the sense that
good exceeds a certain minimal quality threshold.
12Edlin and Reichelstein (1996), in an appendix, present an underlying bargaining game that corresponds
to the constant bargaining share.
13See Stremitzer (2010) for more on the relationship between the informational environment and cooperative
investment.
14While the seller’s outside option depends on his investment in the general model of MacLeod and Mal-
comson (1993), it is assumed to be independent when they study one-sided cooperative investment.
15Segal and Whinston (2000), who study eﬀects of exclusive contracts on investment incentives, assume in
most of their analysis that the only possible contract is the exclusivity provision. In a later section they allow
contracts specifying quantities to be feasible in limited situations where the result of Che and Hausch (1999)
that contracting has no value is conﬁrmed.
9they allow contingent formal contracts while they do not consider ex post price negotiation.
In our model, on the other hand, formal contracts and ex post negotiation play crucial
roles. Baker et al. (2002), Halonen (2002), and Morita (2001) analyze the holdup problem in
inﬁnitely repeated transactions, but their focus is quite diﬀerent from ours. Baker et al. (2002)
and Halonen (2002) study how asset ownership aﬀects the self-enforceability of relational
contracts, and Morita (2001) focuses on the role of partial ownership in resolving the holdup
problem under repeated interaction. None of the studies identify the threat-point eﬀect as an
important factor in determining the value of formal contracting, nor do they capture the idea
that simple formal contracts can play an important role in reducing reneging temptations
under repeated transactions.16 Baker et al. (2001) extend Baker et al. (2002) by allowing
formal contracts contingent on contractible characteristics of trade in addition to allocation
of asset ownership. Although their model is general, they focus on the diﬃculty of “bringing
the market inside the ﬁrm.” Corts (2009) studies eﬀects of repeated interaction on formal
contract choice between cost-plus contracts and ﬁxed-price contracts in construction and
procurement. Neither the value of formal contracting nor the threat-point eﬀect is analyzed
in these papers.
The present paper also sheds new light on recent empirical investigations on the rela-
tionship between relational governance and formal contracts. In the empirical literature
of transaction cost economics, the majority of previous researchers have studied how sev-
eral transactional properties (representing asset speciﬁcity, uncertainty, and transactional
frequency) aﬀect an organizational mode, conceptualized by market, hierarchy, or various
hybrid and intermediate modes (see, for example, Shelanski and Klein (1995) and Boerner
and Macher (2002) for surveys).
Several researchers have recently made an important contribution to this literature by
investigating the relationship between relational governance and formal contracts (see, for
example, Banerjee and Duﬂo (2000); Poppo and Zenger (2002); Corts and Singh (2004);
Kalnins and Mayer (2004)). It has often been argued that relational governance and formal
contracts are substitutes rather than complements (see Dyer and Singh (1998) and Adler
(2001), among others), and that the use of formal contracts may even have undesirable
consequences under relational governance (see Macaulay (1963) for an empirical investigation
and Bernheim and Whinston (1998) for a theoretical analysis). In contrast, Poppo and
Zenger (2002) have recently presented evidence which suggests that relational governance
and formal contracts can be complements. In their investigation of informational service
16Although Baker et al. (2002) employ a holdup model diﬀerent from ours, integration in their model and
ﬁxed-price contracts in our model play a similar role of eliminating ex post opportunities for price negotiation.
See footnotes 18 and 20 for details.
10outsourcing they found that, controlling for several transactional properties such as asset
speciﬁcity, increases in the level of relational governance were associated with greater levels
of complexity in formal contracts (see Ryall and Sampson (2009) for a related ﬁnding).
We contribute to this line of investigation by exploring the relationship between relational
governance and formal contracts in the presence of the holdup problem. Our analysis iden-
tiﬁes whether the threat-point eﬀect is positive or negative in investment as an important
factor in determining the value of formal contracts. We ﬁnd that relational governance and
formal contracts can be complements or substitutes, and that the use of formal contacts
may even have undesirable consequences. Our analysis indicates that they are complements
when the holdup problem is so serious that the relation-speciﬁc investment reduces the ne-
gotiated price, and a necessary condition for this is that the investment reduces the surplus
under no trade (negative threat-point eﬀect). We therefore suggest that some proxies for the
threat-point eﬀect be incorporated in future empirical studies.
3M o d e l
We consider repeated transactions between an upstream party (seller) and a downstream
party (buyer).17 In each period, the seller chooses an action (e.g., investment level) a ∈ A
by incurring private cost d(a). Although a can be fairly general (e.g., multi-dimensional), to
simplify exposition we assume a is real-valued and is measured in terms of the costs of action,
and hence d(a)=a. The set of feasible actions A ⊂ R can be ﬁnite with more than one
elements, countably inﬁnite, or continuous. We assume there exists the least costly action in
A, denoted by a ≥ 0.
The seller’s action aﬀects (i) the value of the seller’s product for the buyer and (ii) the
alternative-use value of the product. Let v(a,θ) be the value for the buyer, where θ is the
state of nature drawn from support Θ = [θ,θ] by a cumulative distribution function F(·),
and let m(a,θ) be the alternative-use value, which we assume accrues to the seller, and the
payoﬀ to an alternative user is zero. The buyer’s outside payoﬀ is independent of the seller’s
action and normalized to zero, and hence the total no-trade surplus is equal to m(a,θ). To
highlight the value of formal contracting in repeated transaction, we assume that at most
one unit of an indivisible product is traded, and the seller’s production cost is normalized to
zero. Hence the seller’s investment is purely “cooperative.” Later in Section 5 we will extend
our main results to the case in which diﬀerent levels of quantity are traded.18
17Throughout the paper we suppose the seller is a male and the buyer is a female for convenience.
18Although we do not study allocation of asset ownership but focus on roles of formal contracting, our
model can be interpreted in terms of asset ownership as follows: There is a physical asset that is owned by
the seller. The seller invests in the asset and uses it to generate value v(a,θ) for the buyer when they trade. If
11We assume v(a,θ) is strictly increasing in a and v(a,θ) >afor all a and θ. The alternative-
use value m(a,θ) may be increasing or decreasing in a as discussed in the previous sections.
We, however, follow the holdup literature by assuming that investment aﬀects v(a,θ)a tl e a s t
as much as m(a,θ) at margins:19
v(a,θ) − v(a ,θ) ≥ m(a,θ) − m(a ,θ) for all θ and a>a  .( 1 )
Denote the eﬃcient action by a∗: a∗ =a r g m a x a(E[v+(a,θ)] − a)w h e r ev+(a,θ)=
max{v(a,θ),m(a,θ)} and E[x(θ)] =
 
x(θ)dF(θ). We assume a∗ is unique and a∗ >a .F o r
simplicity, we assume v+(a∗,θ)=v(a∗,θ) for all θ: under the ﬁrst-best investment, trade is
eﬃcient in all states.
We assume that a, θ, v,a n dm are observable to both parties but unveriﬁable, while
delivery of the product and transfer payments are veriﬁable. Consistent with Che and Hausch
(1999), we assume that the court can observe no investment-related information (including
the value for the buyer) and hence none of the standard breach remedies is available except
for speciﬁc performance.
Suppose that at the beginning of each period the seller and the buyer can agree on a
compensation plan, with the seller promising a particular action. The compensation plan
consists of {w,p,(b(a,θ))a∈A,θ∈Θ},w h e r ew is paid from the buyer to the seller at the be-
ginning of each period and serves the distribution purpose only, p is a formal ﬁxed-price
contract contingent on the delivery of the product, and b(a,θ) is an additional informal pay-
ment made by the buyer when the seller’s action is a and state θ realizes (negative payments
mean transfers from the seller to the buyer). Since delivery of the product is veriﬁable, we
assume that p is enforced with a speciﬁc performance damage clause. On the other hand,
b(a,θ) is not enforceable because neither a nor θ is veriﬁable. In order to investigate the
value of the formal ﬁxed-price contract in resolution of the holdup problem, we compare it
with the case of no formal contract, in which p is not speciﬁed in a compensation plan. When
p is not speciﬁed, b(a,θ) is the (informal) price paid by the buyer contingent on the level of
they do not trade, the seller uses the asset in trade with third parties to obtain m(a,θ). This payoﬀ structure
is essentially identical to nonintegration (where the asset is owned by the seller) in Baker et al. (2002). They
compare this arrangement with integration (buyer ownership). In Edlin and Hermalin (2000) and N¨ oldeke
and Schmidt (1998), the ﬁnal owner of the asset enjoys return r(a,e). The seller chooses to invest a ≥ 0ﬁ r s t
and then the buyer chooses to invest e ≥ 0a f t e ro b s e r v i n ga. They consider the buyer option contract in
which the buyer has the option to buy back the asset at the prespeciﬁed price after the seller invests. If the
buyer does not exercise the option, her optimal choice is e = 0, and hence their models translate into ours by
v(a)=m a x e r(a,e) − e and m(a)=r(a,0) (assuming there is no uncertainty, for simplicity).
19This assumption holds in the models of Edlin and Hermalin (2000) and N¨ oldeke and Schmidt (1998) if
the seller’s investment a and the buyer’s investment e are complements at the margin. Edlin and Hermalin
(2000) show that if (1) holds with strict inequalities and the buyer decides to exercise the option before she
chooses her investment, the seller cannot be induced to choose the ﬁrst-best investment.
12the seller’s action, the state of nature, and the delivery of the product.
Our focus on ﬁxed-price contracts as a form of formal contracts can be justiﬁed by our
objective to show that even writing a simple ﬁxed-price formal contract can help mitigate the
holdup problem under repeated transactions but it is not the case under spot transactions
(Proposition 4 (a)). Furthermore, in subsection 4.5 we identify a natural condition under
which more general formal contracts that may be contingent on messages are of no value,
and hence conﬁning our attention to ﬁxed-price contracts as a form of formal contracts is
without loss of generality.
In each period, the timing is as follows. First, the seller and the buyer can agree on
a compensation plan. If p is speciﬁed in the plan, the agreement includes signatures by
the seller and the buyer on the formal ﬁxed-price contract. Second, the seller chooses an
action. Third, the state of nature realizes. Fourth, after observing the seller’s action and the
state of nature, the buyer and the seller negotiate to an ex post eﬃcient outcome if there
is ineﬃciency. This applies either when trade is ineﬃcient under a ﬁxed-price contract, or
when trade is eﬃcient under no formal contract. In these cases, we assume that the transfer
is determined by the generalized Nash bargaining solution. Let α ∈ [0,1) be the seller’s share
of the surplus, and hence the buyer’s share is 1 − α. Finally, the seller produces and sells
the product to the buyer according to the compensation plan or at the negotiated price, or
in the outside market.
4A n a l y s i s
This section explores the value of formal contracts in resolving or mitigating the holdup
problem under both spot and repeated transactions. In subsections 4.1–4.4, we focus on
ﬁxed-price contracts as a form of formal contracts. In subsection 4.5, we show that this focus
is without loss of generality when ρ(a,θ) is either weakly increasing or weakly decreasing
in a for all realizations of uncertainty θ,w h e r eρ(a,θ) denotes the negotiation price in the
absence of formal contracts (see subsection 4.1 for the deﬁnition of ρ(a,θ)).
4.1 Spot Transactions
When the seller and the buyer meet only once, or they do not use history dependent strategies,
a standard holdup problem can arise. Since b(a,θ) does not play any role in spot transactions,
we simply set b(a,θ) ≡ 0 in this subsection.
Suppose that no formal ﬁxed-price contract is written at the beginning. If state θ sat-
isfying v(a,θ) ≥ m(a,θ) realizes, the seller and the buyer negotiate trade and a price. The
13negotiated price, denoted by ρ(a,θ), is given by
ρ(a,θ)=m(a,θ)+α(v(a,θ) − m(a,θ)) = αv(a,θ)+( 1− α)m(a,θ).
The seller’s payoﬀ is then ρ(a,θ) − a. On the other hand, if v(a,θ) <m (a,θ)h o l d si n
the realized state, there is no negotiation and trade does not occur. The seller’s payoﬀ is
m(a,θ) − a.
Deﬁne ρ+(a,θ)b y
ρ+(a,θ)=m a x {ρ(a,θ),m(a,θ)} = m(a,θ)+αmax{v(a,θ) − m(a,θ),0}.
Then the seller chooses action a that maximizes E[ρ+(a,θ)] − a. Denote the optimal action







In this setup it is easy to show that the seller does not overinvest.
Proposition 1 If no formal ﬁxed-price contract is written at the beginning, the seller does
not overinvest under spot transaction: a∗ ≥ ao.
Proof Supposeinstead a∗ <a o.S i n c e a∗ is uniquely eﬃcient, E[v(a∗,θ)]−a∗ >E [v+(ao,θ)]−
ao,o r
ao − a∗ >E [v+(ao,θ)] − E[v(a∗,θ)]
holds. On the other hand, since ao is optimal under spot transaction,
ao − a∗ ≤ E[ρ+(ao,θ)] − E[ρ+(a∗,θ)]
By α<1, ao >a ∗, and (1),
ρ+(ao,θ) − ρ+(a∗,θ) ≤ v(ao,θ) − v(a∗,θ) ≤ v+(ao,θ) − v(a∗,θ)
holds for all θ. Therefore
ao − a∗ ≤ E[v+(ao,θ)] − E[v(a∗,θ)]
must hold, which is a contradiction. Q.E.D.
Although the seller’s action increases v(a,θ), he cannot capture the full marginal con-
tribution (α<1). This “holdup eﬀect” may be partially oﬀset by the threat-point eﬀect
14that the seller’s action improves his bargaining position via m(a,θ)i fi ti si n c r e a s i n gi na.
However, this eﬀect at most compensates for the return lost by the holdup eﬀect, due to
assumption (1). To make the analysis interesting, we hereafter assume a∗ >a o:T h e r ee x i s t s
a<a ∗ such that the following inequality holds:
a − a∗ <E [ρ+(a,θ)] − E[ρ+(a∗,θ)].
We denote the joint surplus from trade at action a by π(a) ≡ E[v+(a,θ)] − a,a n dt h e
joint surplus at no trade by π ≡ maxa(E[m(a,θ)] − a). To simplify analysis (particularly
under repeated transaction), we assume v(ao,θ) ≤ m(ao,θ) for all θ: for all states no trade
is eﬃcient under action ao. This implies v+(ao,θ)=m(ao,θ) for all θ, and hence π = π(ao):
the equilibrium outcome under spot transaction without formal contracting is that, in neither
state the seller and the buyer trade.
Next, suppose that the buyer and the seller sign a formal ﬁxed-price contract p at the
beginning. If v(a,θ) ≥ m(a,θ), there is no room for negotiation and the parties trade with
price p. The seller’s payoﬀ is p − a.I fv(a,θ) <m (a,θ), however, they negotiate to cancel
the contract and break oﬀ trade. The seller’s payoﬀ is then p + α(m(a,θ) − v(a,θ)) − a.
While there is renegotiation if v(a,θ) <m (a,θ), the payment to the seller is decreasing in a
by assumption (1).
Deﬁne ρ−(a,θ)b y
ρ−(a,θ)=αmax{m(a,θ) − v(a,θ),0} = ρ+(a,θ) − ρ(a,θ).
The seller chooses a to maximize p+E[ρ−(a,θ)]−a, the solution of which is obviously a = a.
The outcome is no better than the case with no formal ﬁxed-price contract, where although
the seller underinvests, he may choose action higher than a. Fixed-price contracts are of no
value under spot transactions, irrespective of the sign of the threat-point eﬀect.20
4.2 Relational Contract without Formal Fixed-Price Contract
We now consider the case in which the seller and the buyer engage in inﬁnitely repeated
transactions, with the common discount factor δ ∈ (0,1). Since they have symmetric in-
formation in our model, we follow MacLeod and Malcomson (1989) and Levin (2003) that
20Baker et al. (2002) assume that under integration (buyer ownership) the buyer can simply take the product
without paying the seller. Their integration is hence equivalent to the ﬁxed-price contact with p =0f o rt h e
case of v(a,θ) ≥ m(a,θ). In contrast to our model, however, Baker et al. (2002) assume that v(a,θ) <m (a,θ)
never happens. If m(a,θ) were tied to the seller even under buyer ownership, their integration and our ﬁxed-
price contracts would be identical for the case of v(a,θ) <m (a,θ) as well. However, if m(a,θ)w e r et i e dt o
the asset, then the buyer owning the asset and ﬁxed-price contracts would no longer be equivalent.
15provide the deﬁnite treatment of models of ongoing contractual relationships. A relational
contract is a complete plan for the relationship describing the compensation plan and the
seller’s action for every period and history. Since a relational contract is in general contingent
on the seller’s action which is observable but unveriﬁable, it must satisfy conditions under
which it is neither party’s interest to renege on the contract: it must be self-enforcing, i.e.,
a subgame perfect equilibrium of the repeated game.
The optimal contract is a self-enforcing relational contract that maximizes the joint sur-
plus. Without loss of generality we can focus on stationary contracts under which in every
period the parties agree on the same compensation plan and the seller chooses the same ac-
tion on the equilibrium path. Furthermore, if either party reneges on the payment or action,
they negotiate to determine the trade in the current period, and, from the next period on,
they revert to no trade, which is the worst equilibrium outcome. Furthermore, for any opti-
mal stationary contract, there is an optimal stationary contract with the same equilibrium
behavior and the property that even oﬀ the equilibrium path the seller and the buyer cannot
jointly beneﬁt from renegotiating to a new self-enforcing contract.21 This implies that, for
any optimal stationary contract, there is an optimal renegotiation-proof stationary contract
with the same equilibrium behavior.22 That is, although our focus on stationary contracts
means that we are assuming that the parties cannot commit not to renegotiate the relational
contract, this assumption is for simplicity and not critical for our results.
In this subsection, we assume no formal ﬁxed-price contract is written. The eﬀects of writ-
ing a formal ﬁxed-price contract are analyzed in the next subsection. We obtain conditions
under which there exists a self-enforcing (stationary) relational contract that implements a
given action ˆ a>a o satisfying π(ˆ a) > π.
The relational contract in this subsection includes the following eﬃcient trade decision,
denoted by e(a,θ) ∈{ 0,1}, and compensation plan b(a,θ):
• If v(a,θ) ≥ m(a,θ), then trade (e(a,θ) = 1) and the buyer pays b(a,θ).
• If v(a,θ) <m (a,θ), then no trade (e(a,θ) = 0) and the buyer pays b(a,θ).
If the parties follow the trade decision and compensation plan as above, the seller’s incentive
compatibility constraints are given as follows.
E[b(ˆ a,θ)+( 1− e(ˆ a,θ))m(ˆ a,θ)] − ˆ a ≥ E[b(a,θ)+( 1− e(a,θ))m(a,θ)] − a for all a (3)
21Although Levin (2003) does not analyze a case where the parties engage in ex post price negotiation in
each period, it is straightforward to generalize his results to such a situation.
22A result in Levin (2003) implies that, for any optimal stationary contract, there is an optimal stationary
contract in which from the next period on after a deviation, the term of transaction is altered to hold the
deviating party to the same payoﬀ as the one in the spot transaction outcome but still keep them on the ex
post eﬃciency frontier. Such an optimal stationary contract is renegotiation proof.
16Note that future payoﬀs do not appear in the constraints. A logic similar to the existence of
optimal stationary contracts can be applied to show that we can further restrict our attention
to contracts that provide the seller’s investment incentives with discretionary payments alone.
However, this does not imply that the optimal stationary contract speciﬁes discretionary
payments: one can construct an equivalent optimal stationary contract in which there is no
discretionary payment and the relationship will be terminated after the seller chooses an
action diﬀerent from the one speciﬁed in the contract.
We next derive the buyer’s self-enforcing condition. If v(a,θ) ≥ m(a,θ) holds, the buyer’s
short-term gain from not paying b(a,θ) and negotiating to trade by price ρ(a,θ)i n s t e a di s
b(a,θ)−ρ(a,θ). If v(a,θ) <m (a,θ) holds, then the buyer’s gain is b(a,θ)s i n c et r a d ei si n e f -
ﬁcient. The buyer’s reneging temptation is hence written as maxa,θ{b(a,θ) − e(a,θ)ρ(a,θ)}.
The buyer will then lose her future per period gain E[e(ˆ a,θ)v(ˆ a,θ)] − w − E[b(a,θ)]. The






(E[e(ˆ a,θ)v(ˆ a,θ)] − w − E[b(ˆ a,θ)]) (4)
The seller’s self-enforcing condition is obtained in a similar fashion. The seller honors the






(w + E[b(ˆ a,θ)+( 1− e(ˆ a,θ))m(ˆ a,θ)] − ˆ a − π). (5)








(π(ˆ a) − π). (6)
And (3) and (6) are also suﬃcient for investment ˆ a to be implemented: one can ﬁnd an
appropriate w such that (4), (5), and the parties’ participation constraints are satisﬁed.
Note that the left-hand side of (6), as well as Baker et al. (2002)’s corresponding condi-
tion,23 still depends on compensation plan b(a,θ). In the next proposition, we go further to
obtain the necessary and suﬃcient condition for compensation plan implementing ˆ a to exist.
Deﬁne the change in expected payments by Δ+(a,a ) ≡ E[ρ+(a,θ) − ρ+(a ,θ)].
Proposition 2 Suppose no formal ﬁxed-price contract is written. The seller’s action ˆ a
satisfying π(ˆ a) > π can be implemented by a relational contract if and only if (DE-NC)
23Condition (6) roughly corresponds to the enforcement condition under nonintegration in Baker et al.
(2002, condition in p.55) where trade is assumed to be always eﬃcient and hence e(a,θ) ≡ 1.
17holds.
ˆ a − ao − Δ+(ˆ a,ao) ≤
δ
1 − δ
(π(ˆ a) − π)( D E - N C )
Proof See Appendix.
The necessary and suﬃcient condition (DE-NC) depends only on the parameters under
the action to be implemented (ˆ a) and the action most preferred by the seller under spot
transactions (ao). Intuitively, the seller’s incentive compatibility constraints are binding at
a = ao, and the buyer must pay the seller suﬃciently higher (ˆ a − ao)f o rˆ a than for ao.
However, the higher pay for ˆ a results in reneging temptations for both parties. The buyer
faces the temptation not to pay the informal price b(ˆ a,θ) but to pay the negotiated price
ρ+(ˆ a,θ). The seller faces the temptation to choose ao, and not to pay a penalty −b(ao,θ)
but to receive ρ+(ao,θ). The total reneging temptation is thus equal to the left-hand side of
(DE-NC), which is nonnegative because the optimality of ao under spot transactions without
formal contracts (2) implies
Δ+(ao,a) ≥ ao − a for all a.( 7 )
This reneging temptation must be at most as large as the total future loss.
Note that the right-hand side of (6) or (DE-NC) does not depend on the compensa-
tion plan. There is hence no compensation plan that makes the total reneging temptation
given in the left-hand side of (6) smaller than the left-hand side of (DE-NC). Therefore, the
compensation plan that is constructed by
b(ˆ a,θ)=e(ˆ a,θ)ρ(ˆ a,θ) − Δ+(ˆ a,ao)+ˆ a − ao
b(a,θ)=e(a,θ)ρ(a,θ), for all a  =ˆ a
in the proof of the proposition minimizes the left-hand side of (6), and in this sense, it is an
optimal contract implementing a given action ˆ a.
4.3 Relational Contract with Formal Fixed-Price Contract
As discussed in Subsection 4.1, formal ﬁxed-price contracts play no role in resolving the
hold-up problem under spot transactions. The story is, however, diﬀerent for repeated trans-
actions.
In this subsection, we continue considering the case in which the seller and the buyer
engage in inﬁnitely repeated transactions, focusing on stationary contracts as in the previous
subsection. Unlike in the previous subsection, however, we consider the case in which the
18buyer and the seller sign a formal ﬁxed-price contract p at the beginning of each period on
the equilibrium path. Note that if either party reneges on additional payments b(a,θ)w h e n
trade is actually eﬃcient, no price negotiation arises because the formal ﬁxed-price contract
p is enforced. From the next period on, the parties revert to no trade. We derive conditions
for a self-enforcing (stationary) relational contract implementing a given action ˆ a to exist.
The relational contract along with a formal ﬁxed-price contract p includes the following
eﬃcient trade decision and compensation plan:
• If v(a,θ) ≥ m(a,θ), then trade following the formal ﬁxed-price contract (e(a,θ)=1 )
and the buyer pays b(a,θ) in addition to p.
• If v(a,θ) <m (a,θ), then cancel the formal contract to no trade (e(a,θ) = 0) and the
buyer pays b(a,θ).
As in the no formal contract case, without loss of generality we assume that incentives are
provided via discretionary payments alone. The seller’s incentive compatibility constraints
are then given as follows.
E[b(ˆ a,θ)+e(ˆ a,θ)p +( 1− e(ˆ a,θ))m(ˆ a,θ)] − ˆ a
≥ E[b(a,θ)+e(a,θ)p +( 1− e(a,θ))m(a,θ)] − a for all a
(8)
The buyer’s reneging temptation is derived as follows. First, when v(a,θ) ≥ m(a,θ), the
buyer can refuse to pay b(a,θ) though she has to follow the formal contract and pay p.H e r
short-term gain is b(a,θ). Next when v(a,θ) <m (a,θ), the buyer can refuse to cancel the
formal contract and to pay b(a,θ), and instead negotiate to obtain
v(a,θ) − p +( 1− α)(m(a,θ) − v(a,θ)) = ρ(a,θ) − p.
The buyer’s reneging temptation is thus written as maxa,θ{b(a,θ)+(1−e(a,θ))(ρ(a,θ)−p)}.






(E[e(ˆ a,θ)v(ˆ a,θ)] − w − p − E[b(ˆ a,θ)]). (9)






(w + p + E[b(ˆ a,θ)+( 1− e(ˆ a,θ))m(ˆ a,θ)] − ˆ a − π).
(10)
19Combining these conditions yields24
max
a,θ
{b(a,θ)+( 1− e(a,θ))(ρ(a,θ) − p)}−min
a,θ




(π(ˆ a) − π)
(11)
Deﬁne the change in expected payments by
Δ−(a,a )=E[ρ−(a,θ) − ρ−(a ,θ)]
= αE[max{m(a,θ) − v(a,θ),0}−max{m(a ,θ) − v(a ,θ),0}],
which is nonpositive if a>a  .
Proposition 3 The seller’s action ˆ a satisfying π(ˆ a) > π can be implemented by combining
a formal ﬁxed-price contract and a relational contract if and only if (DE-FP) holds.
ˆ a − a − Δ−(ˆ a,a) ≤
δ
1 − δ
(π(ˆ a) − π)( D E - F P )
Proof See Appendix.
The necessary and suﬃcient condition (DE-FP) depends only on two actions ˆ a and a
the latter of which is the one most preferred by the seller under a spot transaction with a
ﬁxed-price contract. Intuitively, the buyer faces the temptation not to pay an informal price
b(ˆ a,θ) but to pay αmax{m(ˆ a,θ)−v(ˆ a,θ),0} in addition to p. The seller faces the temptation
to choose a, and not to pay a penalty −b(a,θ) but to receive αmax{m(a,θ) − v(a,θ),0} in
addition to p. The total reneging temptation is thus equal to the left-hand side of (DE-FP).
4.4 Comparison
We can analyze the value of writing a formal ﬁxed-price contract in repeated transactions
by comparing two conditions, (DE-NC) for the case of no formal ﬁxed-price contract, and
(DE-FP) for the case of writing a formal ﬁxed-price contract.
The conditions diﬀer only in terms of the reneging temptations given on the left-hand
sides, and the reneging temptations are diﬀerent in two respects. One diﬀerence is captured
by the term Δ+(ˆ a,ao)i n( D E - N C )a n dΔ −(ˆ a,a)i n( D E - F P ) .Δ +(ˆ a,ao) is nonzero when trade
is eﬃcient under either ˆ a or ao so that after reneging, the seller and the buyer negotiate the
24Condition (11) roughly corresponds to the enforcement condition under integration in Baker et al. (2002,
condition (10) in p.52). Since trade is always eﬃcient in Baker et al. (2002), the left-hand side is simpliﬁed
to maxa,θ b(a,θ) − mina,θ b(a,θ).
20price to trade the product under no formal contract. On the other hand, Δ−(ˆ a,a) is nonzero
when trade is ineﬃcient under either ˆ a or a so that after reneging, they negotiate the transfer
to cancel trade under a formal ﬁxed-price contract.
The other diﬀerence, captured by the term (ˆ a−ao)i n( D E - N C )a n d( ˆ a−a)i n( D E - F P ) ,
arises because the seller’s optimal action under a spot transaction may be diﬀerent. It is a
under a formal ﬁxed-price contract, while ao, the optimal action under no formal contract,
may be higher than a. Without formal contracting, the seller may choose an action higher
than the least costly level because his action has positive eﬀects on the price determined by
negotiation, which depends on the seller’s share (α) and the marginal values under trade and
no trade. Since the value under trade v(a,θ) is increasing in action, it provides the seller
with an incentive to choose a higher action if the seller’s share is positive. Furthermore,
if the alternative-use value m(a,θ) increases with action so that the threat-point eﬀect is
positive, it provides an additional incentive to increase action, although the eﬀect is not as
large as that of the value for the buyer because of (1). And even if the alternative-use value
is decreasing so that the threat-point eﬀect is negative, the marginal beneﬁt of action for the
buyer captured by the seller may be so large that the seller is induced to choose ao >a .O n
the other hand, the incentive via the price determined by negotiation is never positive under
a ﬁxed-price contract. If trade is always eﬃcient, there will be no negotiation and hence the
seller is paid a constant amount equal to the ﬁxed price. If trade is ineﬃcient, higher action
reduces the total surplus and hence the negotiated price, whether the threat-point eﬀect is
positive or negative. The seller hence chooses the least costly action under formal ﬁxed-price
contracts.
The following comparative result is now immediate.
Proposition 4 Consider the implementation of ˆ a satisfying π(ˆ a) > π.
(a) Suppose (ao − a)+Δ +(ˆ a,ao) − Δ−(ˆ a,a) < 0h o l d s . I fˆ a can be implemented under
repeated transactions without any formal contract, the same action can be implemented
under repeated transactions with an appropriate ﬁxed-price contract. And there is a
range of parameter values in which ˆ a can be implemented only if a formal ﬁxed-price
contract is written.
(b) Suppose (ao − a)+Δ +(ˆ a,ao) − Δ−(ˆ a,a) > 0h o l d s . I fˆ a can be implemented under
repeated transactions with a formal ﬁxed-price contract, the same action can be im-
plemented under repeated transactions without any formal contract. And there is a
range of parameter values in which ˆ a can be implemented only if no formal ﬁxed-price
contract is written.
21Proposition 4 (a) shows that in contrast to a well-known result in the case of spot transac-
tions that “formal contracting has no value,” a simple formal ﬁxed-price contract, combined
with informal discretionary payments or termination of trade, can help mitigate the holdup
problem under repeated transactions. The condition reﬂects two sources of diﬀerences in the
reneging temptation explained above.
To better understand the condition and develop intuition behind the result, we ﬁrst
suppose ao = a: under spot transactions, the seller faces no incentive to choose action higher
than the least costly level. This is the case in our two-investment example in Introduction.
Then the condition in (a) is equivalent to
Δ+(ˆ a,a) − Δ−(ˆ a,a)=E[ρ(ˆ a,θ) − ρ(a,θ)] < 0, (12)
that is, the total negotiated price is lower for the higher action ˆ a than for a.
Suppose further that Δ−(ˆ a,a) = 0, that is, there is no price negotiation under ﬁxed-price
contracts. This condition holds when, for example, v(ˆ a,θ) ≥ m(ˆ a,θ)a n dv(a,θ)=m(a,θ)
for all θ.25 Condition (12) then becomes Δ+(ˆ a,a) < 0, implying that price negotiation brings
negative incentive under no formal contract. In this case, by eliminating the eﬀect of the
price negotiation on the reneging temptation, a well-designed formal ﬁxed-price contract can
reduce the reneging temptation from (ˆ a−a)−E[ρ(ˆ a,θ)−ρ(a,θ)] to (ˆ a−a). Therefore, there
is a range of parameter values in which (DE-FP) holds while (DE-NC) does not.
More generally without assuming Δ−(ˆ a,a) = 0, price negotiation can happen under a
ﬁxed-price contract when trade is ineﬃcient, and under no formal contract when trade is
eﬃcient. The total diﬀerence of reneging temptation is thus always summarized by (12), and
this being negative implies the reneging temptation is smaller under a ﬁxed-price contract.
Since the post-reneging price is determined by the generalized Nash bargaining solution,
E[ρ(ˆ a,θ) − ρ(a,θ)] is rewritten as
E[ρ(ˆ a,θ) − ρ(a,θ)] = E [α(v(ˆ a,θ) − v(a,θ)) + (1 − α)(m(ˆ a,θ) − m(a,θ))].
A necessary condition for (12) is thus E[m(ˆ a,θ)] <E [m(a,θ)]: Increasing action from a
to ˆ a weakens the seller’s bargaining position by reducing his expected payoﬀ at the threat
point. We have already argued in Section 1 that this is plausible under some settings.
Under repeated transactions, this negative threat-point eﬀect brings a new negative eﬀect
of raising the total reneging temptation without a formal ﬁxed-price contract. The formal
ﬁxed-price contract can eliminate the negative “market incentive” and hence can be valuable
25More generally, this condition holds when trade is always eﬃcient, that is, v(a,θ) ≥ m(a,θ) for all a and
θ.
22if in addition the holdup eﬀect is suﬃciently large (α is suﬃciently small).
On the other hand, Proposition 4 (b) implies that if the threat-point eﬀect is zero (as in
Che and Hausch (1999)) or positive, the formal ﬁxed-price contract has no value even under
repeated interactions. Furthermore, reducing such a positive “market incentive” by writing
a formal ﬁxed-price contract may decrease the total surplus under repeated transactions.
Note that the result follows even though we are assuming ao = a, that is, the threat-point
eﬀect is not large enough to increase the seller’s action from the least costly level under spot
transactions. The formal ﬁxed-price contract has a negative value because of the increasing
reneging temptation under repeated transactions.26
The two-investment example in Section 1 corresponds to α = 0 (the buyer’s take-it-or-
leave-it oﬀer), and hence the sign of Δm = m1 − m0 i st h es a m ea st h a to fE[ρ(ˆ a,θ)] −
E[ρ(a,θ)]: the sign of the threat-point eﬀect fully determines the value of writing a formal
ﬁxed-price contract. In more general settings analyzed in this section, the holdup eﬀect must
be suﬃciently large (α suﬃciently small) and the threat-point eﬀect must intensify this by
being suﬃciently negative.
We have so far developed intuition under assumption ao = a, in order to clarify how
crucial is the marginal eﬀect of action on the post-reneging price, and in particular the
threat-point eﬀect, for the value of writing a formal ﬁxed-price contract. Now consider a
more general case of ao ≥ a. Suppose the seller’s eﬀort incentive through price negotiation
is so strong that the seller is induced to choose an action higher than the least costly level
even under a spot transaction (ao >a ). This advantage of not writing a formal ﬁxed-price
contract under a spot transaction plays an additional beneﬁcial role of reducing the reneging
temptation under repeated transactions, because the incentive necessary to induce the seller
to choose ˆ a decreases from ˆ a − a to ˆ a − ao. The condition for writing a formal ﬁxed-price
contract to be valuable is now (ao − a)+Δ +(ˆ a,ao) − Δ−(ˆ a,a) < 0: the value of writing a
formal ﬁxed-price contract thus may not be positive even if the expected post-reneging price
is decreasing.
However, writing a formal ﬁxed-price contract can still be beneﬁcial if Δ+(ˆ a,ao)−Δ−(ˆ a,a)
is suﬃciently negative and dominates the eﬀect of increasing the reneging temptation by
ao − a. It is easy to construct an example in which despite ao >a ,w r i t i n gaf o r m a lﬁ x e d -
price contract is of value under repeated transactions.
26This result has a ﬂavor of an endogenous incomplete contract. Bernheim and Whinston (1998) show that
parties may optimally leave some veriﬁable aspects of performance unspeciﬁed (“strategic ambiguity”) in order
to alter the set of feasible self-enforcing informal agreements. Not writing a formal ﬁxed-price contract in our
model may be classiﬁed as one form of strategic ambiguity, although the underlying models and logics are
diﬀerent. While we model the dynamic contracting problem in the context of inﬁnitely repeated interaction
and emphasize the eﬀect on the alternative-use values, they consider two-period dynamic models with or
without intertemporal payoﬀ linkages.
234.5 General Formal Contracts
We have so far restricted our analysis to two polar cases of formal contracting, either no
formal contract or a ﬁxed-price contract. In this subsection, we consider general formal
contracts that may be contingent on the messages sent by the buyer and the seller. We
ﬁrst extend the well-known result of Che and Hausch (1999) concerning the foundation of
incomplete contracting to our setup in which the seller’s action aﬀects the surplus under no
trade, and show that formal contracts are of no value under spot transactions when ρ(a,θ)i s
either weakly increasing or weakly decreasing in a for all θ. We then consider general formal
contracts under repeated transactions and show that, under the same condition, it is without
loss of generality to conﬁne our attention to two polar cases: either not writing a formal
contract or writing a ﬁxed-price contract attains the highest investment incentives.
Spot Transaction
A general formal contract is written as {p(ηb,η s),q(ηb,η s)},w h e r eηb =( ab,θ b) is the buyer’s
report, ηs =( as,θ s) is the seller’s report. For all reports (ηb,η s), the contract speciﬁes trade
decision q(ηb,η s) ∈{ 0,1} and payment from the buyer to the seller p(ηb,η s). If the trade
decision is ineﬃcient for action and state η =( a,θ), the parties renegotiate the contract
to the eﬃcient trade decision e(η), where e(η)=1i fv(η) − m(η) ≥ 0a n de(η)=0i f
v(η)−m(η) < 0. The ex post payoﬀs in η, resulting from the contract and renegotiation, are
as follows:
uB(ηb,η s | η)=v(η)q(ηb,η s) − p(ηb,η s)+( 1− α)e(η)(v(η) − m(η))(1 − q(ηb,η s))
+( 1− α)(1 − e(η))(m(η) − v(η))q(ηb,η s)
uS(ηb,η s | η)=p(ηb,η s)+m(η)(1 − q(ηb,η s)) + αe(η)(v(η) − m(η))(1 − q(ηb,η s))
+ α(1 − e(η))(m(η) − v(η))q(ηb,η s)
Note uB(ηb,η s | η)+uS(ηb,η s | η)=m a x {v(η),m(η)} holds for all η.
For each η =( a,θ), truth telling must form a Nash equilibrium:
uS(η) ≡ uS(η,η | η) ≥ uS(η, ˆ η | η), ∀ˆ η
uB(η) ≡ uB(η,η | η) ≥ uB(ˆ η,η | η), ∀ˆ η
Using the zero-sum feature of the payoﬀs yields uB(ˆ η) ≥ uB(η, ˆ η | ˆ η) if and only if uS(ˆ η) ≤
24uS(η, ˆ η | ˆ η). Thus we must have
uS(ˆ η) − uS(η) ≤ uS(η, ˆ η | ˆ η) − uS(η, ˆ η | η)
=( 1− q(η, ˆ η))
 
ρ+(ˆ η) − ρ+(η)
 
+ q(η, ˆ η)
 
ρ−(ˆ η) − ρ−(η)
  (13)
Proposition 5 Suppose ρ(a,θ) is either weakly increasing in a for all θ, or weakly decreasing
in a for all θ. Then formal contracts are of no value under spot transactions.
Proof Suppose instead there is a contract under which the seller’s optimal choice is ˆ a>a o
satisfying π(ˆ a) > π = π(ao). Then by the seller’s incentive compatibility constraints the
following inequality must hold.
E[uS(ˆ a,θ)] − E[uS(ao,θ)] ≥ ˆ a − ao
By speciﬁcity (1) and ˆ a>a o, ρ−(ˆ η) − ρ−(η) ≤ 0h o l d sf o ra l lθ where ˆ η =( ˆ a,θ)a n d
η =( ao,θ). Hence by (13) uS(ˆ η) − uS(η) ≤ (1 − q(η, ˆ η))(ρ+(ˆ η) − ρ+(η)) for all θ.W et h u s
obtain
E[uS(ˆ a,θ) − uS(ao,θ))] ≤ E
 
(1 − q((ao,θ),(ˆ a,θ)))
 
ρ+(ˆ a,θ) − ρ+(ao,θ)
  
Now suppose ﬁrst ρ(ˆ a,θ) ≥ ρ(ao,θ) for all θ.T h e n
ˆ a − ao ≤ E
 
(1 − q((ao,θ),(ˆ a,θ)))
 
ρ+(ˆ a,θ) − ρ+(ao,θ)
  
≤ Δ+(ˆ a,ao)
which contradicts ˆ a  =a r gm a x a E [ρ+(a,θ)] − a
Next suppose ρ(ˆ a,θ) ≤ ρ(ao,θ) for all θ.T h e n
ˆ a − ao ≤ E
 
(1 − q((ao,θ),(ˆ a,θ)))
 
ρ+(ˆ a,θ) − ρ+(ao,θ)
  
≤ 0
which contradicts ˆ a>a o. Q.E.D.
Proposition 5 identiﬁes a suﬃcient condition for the well-known result of Che and Hausch
(1999) to hold when alternative-use value depends on a. Formal contracts cannot improve
the seller’s eﬀort incentives from the no contract case if the eﬀects of uncertainty θ is not too
large to alter the sign of the eﬀects of investment a on the negotiated price. For example,
this condition holds if both v(a,θ)a n dm(a,θ) are additively separable in terms of a and θ:
v(a,θ)=v(a)+x(θ)a n dm(a,θ)=m(a)+y(θ), with αv(a)+(1−α)m(a) being monotone in
a. It also holds if θ does not aﬀect the negotiated price because, either there is no uncertainty
in the value for the buyer and the alternative-use value, or, as in Edlin and Hermalin (2000),
25the parties can renegotiate only before uncertainty resolves.27 Finally, the condition holds if,
as in Che and Hausch (1999), the alternative-use value m(a,θ) does not depend on a.
If the condition is violated, formal contracts contingent on messages may be of value,
although ﬁxed-price contracts are not, as the following example shows.
Example 1
Let θ ∈{ θL,θ H} and β =P r {θ = θH}. The agent’s action is either a = 0 (no investment) or
a = 1 (investment), the latter of which costs him d>0. Denote vat = v(a,θt), mat = m(a,θt),
ρat = ρ(a,θ), and so on, for a =0 ,1a n dt = L,H. The marginal eﬀects of the seller’s action
on these values are denoted by Δvt = v1t − v0t and Δmt = m1t − m0t.
The key feature of the example is that the negotiated price is increasing in investment
in state θH while it is decreasing in state θL. We assume α = 0 so that the negotiated price
is ρat = mat. And we assume no-trade surplus satisﬁes the following conditions: m0L =
m0H = m0 and m1H >m 0 >m 1L. The ﬁrst assumption is for simplicity: state does not
aﬀect no-trade surplus under no investment. The second assumption implies ΔmH > 0a n d
ΔmL < 0: the threat-point eﬀect is positive in state θH, but negative in state θL.
As for vat, we assume v1H >m 1H, m0 ≥ v0H,a n dv1L >m 0 ≥ v0L. These assumptions
imply Δvt > 0a n dΔ vt > Δmt. And for all states trade is eﬃcient when the seller invests
while it is ineﬃcient when he does not.
We assume βΔmH +( 1− β)ΔmL <d<β ΔmH. The ﬁrst inequality implies underin-
vestment occurs if no contract is written. And the seller obviously chooses a = 0 under
ﬁxed-price contract.
Now consider the following form of formal contracts: {pi
j,qi
j} where i ∈{ 0,1} is the
buyer’s report concerning the seller’s action, j ∈{ L,H} is the seller’s report concerning
state, pi
j is the payment by the buyer to the seller, and qi
j ∈{ 0,1} is the decision of trade
(1) or no trade (0). Note ﬁxed-price contract corresponds to pi
j ≡ p and qi
j ≡ 1. The trade









H = 0. The idea is to utilize positive “market incentive” by not specifying
trade when state is θH, while the formal contract specifying trade in state θL prevents the
negotiated price from aﬀecting the seller’s incentive negatively.
We ﬁrst show that this contract induces investment by the seller, provided that both the
buyer and the seller report truthfully. If the seller invests, his expected payoﬀ is βm1H +
27Under the assumption of this timing, Edlin and Hermalin (2000) show a result similar to ours that an
optimal second-best arrangement among general mechanisms where both parties send messages about the
seller’s action is for the buyer to transfer ownership to the seller ex ante and simply bargain for the asset after
the seller has invested, which arrangement corresponds to our no contract case.
26(1−β)m0 −a. If the seller does not invest, his expected payoﬀ is βm0 +(1−β)m0 = m0.I t
is optimal for the seller to invest because of assumption βΔmH >d .
We next show that the buyer reports truthfully. Suppose the seller’s investment is a,t h e




t)(vat −mat), which does not depend on the buyer’s report i by the construction of the
formal contract. Hence she has no incentive to misreport.
The remaining task is to show that the seller reports truthfully. Suppose the seller’s
investment is a, the true state is θt, and the buyer reports a truthfully. If the seller reports
θH,h i sp a y o ﬀi smat −da. If the seller reports θL,h i sp a y o ﬀi sm0−da. When the true state
is θH, maH − da ≥ m0 − da must hold, which conditions are satisﬁed for a =0 ,1 because
m1H >m 0H = m0. Finally, when the true state is θL, maL −da ≤ m0−da must hold, which
inequalities are satisﬁed because m1L <m 0L = m0.
Repeated Transactions
We next extend the analysis of general formal contracts to repeated transactions. Consider
formal (short-term) contracts {p(ηb,η s),q(ηb,η s)} along with the relational contract that
consists of the following promises:
• The seller chooses ˆ a and both the buyer and the seller report truthfully.
• If v(η) ≥ m(η)a n dq(η,η) = 1, then trade following the formal contract (e(η) = 1) and
the buyer pays b(η) in addition to p(η,η)
• If v(η) ≥ m(η)a n dq(η,η) = 0, then cancel the formal contract to trade (e(η) = 1) and
the buyer pays b(η)
• If v(η) <m (η)a n dq(η,η) = 1, then cancel the formal contract to no trade (e(η)=0 )
and the buyer pays b(η)
• If v(η) <m (η)a n dq(η,η) = 0, then no trade following the formal contract (e(η)=0 )
and the buyer pays b(η) in addition to p(η,η)
The ex post payoﬀs in state η when both report truthfully are given as follows:
uB(η)=e(η)v(η) − b(η) − p(η,η)R(η)
uS(η)=( 1− e(η))m(η)+b(η)+p(η,η)R(η)
where R(η)=e(η)q(η,η)+(1−e(η))(1−q(η,η)). Note that uB(η)+uS(η)=e(η)v(η)+(1−
e(η))m(η)=m a x {v(η),m(η)} holds for all η.
27If the parties follow the informal promises, the seller’s incentive compatibility constraints
are given as follows.
E[(1 − e(ˆ a,θ))m(ˆ a,θ)+b(ˆ a,θ)+p((ˆ a,θ),(ˆ a,θ))R(ˆ a,θ)] − ˆ a
≥ E[(1 − e(a,θ))m(a,θ)+b(a,θ)+p((a,θ),(a,θ))R(a,θ)] − a for all a
(14)
The buyer’s payoﬀ from deviating in state ˆ η by reporting η is written as
uB(η, ˆ η | ˆ η)=e(ˆ η)v(ˆ η)+( 1− e(ˆ η))q(η, ˆ η)m(ˆ η) − p(η, ˆ η)
− (1 − q(η, ˆ η))ρ+(ˆ η) − q(η, ˆ η)ρ−(ˆ η)
For example, suppose e(ˆ η)=1a n dq(η, ˆ η) = 1. The buyer deviates by reporting η and not
paying b(ˆ η), and hence her payoﬀ is v(ˆ η)−p(η, ˆ η). Note there is no negotiation after reneging
in this case. As another case, suppose e(ˆ η)=0a n dq(η, ˆ η) = 1. In this case the buyer reports
η,d o e sn o tp a yb(ˆ η) but negotiate to obtain v(ˆ η)−p(η, ˆ η)+(1−α)(m(ˆ η)−v(ˆ η)). Her payoﬀ
is thus m(ˆ η) − p(η, ˆ η) − α(m(ˆ η) − v(ˆ η)) = m(ˆ η) − p(η, ˆ η) − ρ−(ˆ η). One can check the other
two cases similarly to obtain the buyer’s payoﬀ as above. The buyer’s reneging temptation
is thus maxη,η[uB(η ,η| η) − uB(η)].
Similarly, the seller’s payoﬀ from deviating in state η by reporting ˆ η is written as
uS(η, ˆ η | η)=( 1− e(η))(1 − q(η, ˆ η))m(η)+p(η, ˆ η)
+( 1− q(η, ˆ η))ρ+(η)+q(η, ˆ η)ρ−(η)
The seller’s reneging temptation is hence −minη,η[uS(η ,η| η ) − uS(η )].
The sum of these reneging temptations are rewritten as follows:
max
η,η [uB(η ,η| η) − uB(η)] − min
η,η [uS(η ,η| η ) − uS(η )]
≥ max
θ
[uB((a,θ),(ˆ a,θ) | (ˆ a,θ)) − uB(ˆ a,θ)] − min
θ
[uS((a,θ),(ˆ a,θ) | (a,θ)) − uS(a,θ)]
≥ E[uB((a,θ),(ˆ a,θ)) | (ˆ a,θ)) − uB(ˆ a,θ)] − E[uS((a,θ),(ˆ a,θ) | (a,θ)) − uS(a,θ)]
≥ ˆ a − a − E[(1 − q((a,θ),(ˆ a,θ)))(ρ+(ˆ a,θ) − ρ+(a,θ)) + q((a,θ),(ˆ a,θ))(ρ−(ˆ a,θ) − ρ−(a,θ))]
=ˆ a − a − E[(ρ+(ˆ a,θ) − ρ+(a,θ)) − q((a,θ),(ˆ a,θ))(ρ(ˆ a,θ) − ρ(a,θ))]
28Now consider the implementation of action ˆ a>a o and suppose ρ(a,θ)i si n c r e a s i n gi na
for all θ. By setting a = ao,w eo b t a i n
max
η,η [uB(η ,η) − uB(η)] − min
η,η [uS(η ,η) − uS(η)]
≥ ˆ a − ao − Δ+(ˆ a,ao)
The right-hand side is attained by no contract. Hence the reneging temptation is minimized
by not writing a formal contract.
Next suppose ρ(a,θ) is decreasing in a for all θ. By setting a = a,w eo b t a i n
max
η,η [uB(η ,η) − uB(η)] − min
η,η [uS(η ,η) − uS(η)]
≥ ˆ a − a − Δ−(ˆ a,a)
The right-hand side is attained by a ﬁxed-price contract. Hence the reneging temptation is
minimized by writing a ﬁxed-price contract. We have hence shown the following result.
Proposition 6 Suppose ρ(a,θ) is either weakly increasing in a for all θ, or weakly decreasing
in a for all θ. Then it is without loss of generality to conﬁne attention to no contract or ﬁxed-
price contracts under repeated transactions.
5 Multiple Quantities
In the main model analyzed in the previous section, we have made an assumption that at
most one unit of the product is traded, which has helped us understand the driving forces
of our main results as clearly as possible. In this section, we introduce the possibility of
trading more than one unit into our model. As in the previous section, it can be shown
that conﬁning our attention to ﬁxed-price contracts as a form of formal contracts is without
loss of generality under a natural condition that is analogous to the one identiﬁed in the
previous section. Given this, we focus on formal ﬁxed-price contracts in this section. We ﬁrst
derive a suﬃcient condition for writing a ﬁxed-price contract to be of no value under a spot
transaction, and illustrate through an example that if the condition does not hold, formal
ﬁxed-price contracts can be valuable even under spot transaction, because of the negative
threat-point eﬀect. We then show, using the same example, the following two results: (i)
When writing a ﬁxed-price contract is of no value under a spot transaction, it can be valuable
under a range of parameterizations if the transaction is repeated. (ii) When writing a ﬁxed-
price contract is of value under a spot transaction, it can be valuable under a broader range
of parameterizations if the transaction is repeated. The driving force of both (i) and (ii) is
29the role that formal contracts can play under repeated transactions in mitigating the parties’
reneging temptation.
Let Q be the set of feasible quantity levels. We assume Q is countable (either ﬁnite or
inﬁnite): Q = {0,q 1,q 2,...} with 0 <q 1 <q 2 < ···, where 0 corresponds to no trade. The
value to the buyer is written as v(q,a,θ). We assume v(0,a,θ)=0 ,v(q,a,θ) is strictly
increasing in q for all (a,θ), and v(q,a,θ) is strictly increasing in a for all q>0a n dθ.S i n c e
there are multiple quantities to be traded, we introduce the seller’s production cost c(q,θ).
We assume c(0,θ) = 0, and c(q,θ) is strictly increasing in q for all θ.
Deﬁne φ(q,a,θ)=v(q,a,θ) − c(q,θ). We assume for each (a,θ) there exists a unique
eﬃcient quantity q∗(a,θ) = argmaxq∈Q φ(q,a,θ), and 0 <q ∗(a,θ) < +∞ for all (a,θ). We
assume quantity and action are complementary:
φ(q,a,θ) − φ(q,a ,θ) ≥ φ(q ,a,θ) − φ(q ,a  ,θ) for all q>q  , a>a  ,a n dθ. (15)
This assumption is suﬃcient for q∗(a,θ)t ob ei n c r e a s i n gi na.
We write φ(a,θ)=φ(q∗(a,θ),a,θ), v(a,θ)=v(q∗(a,θ),a,θ), and c(a,θ)=c(q∗(a,θ),θ).
The assumption of “speciﬁcity,” corresponding to (1), is written as
φ(a,θ) − φ(a ,θ) ≥ m(a,θ) − m(a ,θ) for all θ and a>a  . (16)
The ﬁrst-best investment a∗ is assumed to be unique, and is deﬁned similarly by a∗ =
argmaxa E[φ+(a,θ)] − a where φ+(a,θ)=m a x {φ(a,θ),m(a,θ)}. As before, we assume
φ+(a∗,θ)=φ(a∗,θ) for all θ.
We obtain a suﬃcient condition for ﬁxed-price contracts to be of no value under spot
transactions. First we analyze the case in which no formal contract is written. As before, let





1i f φ(a,θ) ≥ m(a,θ)
0i f φ(a,θ) <m (a,θ)
Then if e(a,θ) = 1, the buyer and the seller negotiate transfer to trade q∗(a,θ). The buyer’s
payoﬀ is then (1 − α)(φ(a,θ) − m(a,θ)), and the seller’s payoﬀ is ρ(a,θ) − a = m(a,θ)+
α(φ(a,θ) − m(a,θ)) − a. On the other hand, if e(a,θ) = 0, there is no negotiation and no
trade occurs. The buyer’s payoﬀ is 0 and the seller’s payoﬀ is m(a,θ) − a.
The seller’s decision is written as follows:
max
a E[ρ+(a,θ)] − a =m a x
a E[m(a,θ)+αmax{φ(a,θ) − m(a,θ),0}] − a. (17)
30Denote the optimal investment by ao. Proposition 1 applies here, with minor modiﬁcation,
to show ao ≤ a∗. We hereafter assume ao <a ∗.
Next consider a formal contract (p,q) meaning the parties trade quantity q and the buyer
pays p to the seller. Under this contract, if e(a,θ) = 1, they negotiate to trade q∗(a,θ). The
buyer’s payoﬀ and the seller’s payoﬀ are, respectively, obtained as follows:
The buyer’s payoﬀ: v(q,a,θ) − p +( 1− α)(φ(a,θ) − φ(q,a,θ));
The seller’s payoﬀ: p − c(q,θ)+α(φ(a,θ) − φ(q,a,θ)) − a.
Note that the special case of q = q∗(a,θ) is covered here as well.
On the other hand, if e(a,θ) = 0, the parties cancel the contract and negotiate to no
trade. The payoﬀs are then as follows:
The buyer’s payoﬀ: φ(a,θ) − p +( 1− α)(m(a,θ) − φ(q,a,θ)) :
The seller’s payoﬀ: p − c(q,θ)+α(m(a,θ) − φ(q,a,θ)) − a.




αE[φ(a,θ) − φ(q,a,θ)] + E[ρ−(a,θ)] − a (18)
Denote the optimal action under ﬁxed-price contract (p,q)b ya1(q). The optimal ﬁxed-
price contract is the one that maximizes a1(q). (18) implies the optimal contract minimizes
the marginal eﬀect of E[φ(q,a,θ)], which is attained at q = q1 under assumption (15):
Specifying the minimum positive quantity in the contract provides the strongest incentive.
Deﬁne a1 = a1(q1).
Proposition 7 Deﬁne ρ(q,a,θ)=m(a,θ)+α(φ(q,a,θ) − m(a,θ))
(a) ao ≥ a1 if E[ρ(q1,a,θ)] is increasing in a.
(b) ao ≤ a1 if E[ρ(q1,a,θ)] is decreasing in a
Proof Rewrite the objective function in (18) as follows:
αE[φ(a,θ) − φ(q1,a,θ)] + E[ρ−(a,θ)] − a
= E[α(φ(a,θ) − φ(q1,a,θ)) + α(1 − e(a,θ))(m(a,θ) − φ(a,θ))] − a
= E[m(a,θ)+α(φ(a,θ) − e(a,θ)m(a,θ)) − m(a,θ) − α(φ(q1,a,θ) − m(a,θ))] − a
= E[ρ+(a,θ) − ρ(q1,a,θ)] − a (19)
31Now the conclusion follows from (17) and (19). Q.E.D.
Applying Proposition 7 to our model in Section 3 where Q = {0,1} and q1 =1=q∗(a,θ)
yields the following. There the condition that E[ρ(q1,a,θ)] is increasing in a is equivalent to
E[ρ(a,θ)] being increasing in a, and hence ao ≥ a = a1. On the other hand, the condition
that E[ρ(q1,a,θ)] is decreasing in a is equivalent to E[ρ(a,θ)] being decreasing in a, and hence
ao = a = a1: the least costly action is chosen either under no formal contracting or under a
ﬁxed-price contract. Fixed-price contracts hence cannot improve investment incentives from
the case of no formal contracts under spot transactions.
However, if |Q|≥3, a1 >a o is possible. In the following example we ﬁrst illustrate
this possibility. More importantly, we then use the same example to illustrate that under
repeated transactions, formal ﬁxed-price contracts can be valuable under a broader range
of parameter values when a1 >a o, and there appears a range of parameter values in which
ﬁxed-price contracts are of value even though writing a ﬁxed-price contract is not valuable
under a spot transaction (a1 ≤ ao).
Example 2
Let Q = {0,q 1,q 2} and A = {0,1}. There is no uncertainty and hence we drop θ.W e
also use notations φa(q)=φ(q,a), φa = φ(q∗(a),a), ma = m(a), and so on, for action
a =0 ,1. Assume φ1 = φ1(q2) >φ 1(q1) >m 1,a n dm0 ≥ φ0 = φ0(q2) >φ 0(q1). Hence
q∗(1) = q∗(0) = q2 holds, and trading q2 is eﬃcient under a = 1 while no trade is eﬃcient
under action 0. We can choose these values so as to satisfy the other assumptions (15) and
(16). The eﬃcient action is assumed to be a∗ =1 :
φ1 − m0 >d
where d>0 is the cost of investment (a = 1). Deﬁne ρa(q)=ma + α(φa(q) − ma)a n d
ρ+
a = ma + αmax{φa − ma,0}. Suppose
Δm + α(φ1 − m1) <d (20)
where Δm = m1−m0 represents the threat-point eﬀect. This assumption implies ρ+
1 −ρ+
0 <d ,
that is, the seller chooses not to invest (a = 0) under no contract.
There are two kinds of ﬁxed-price contracts. First, consider a ﬁxed-price contract spec-
ifying quantity q2:( p,q = q2). Since q = q2 is the eﬃcient quantity, there is no negotiation
under investment, and hence the seller chooses no investment.
Next consider a ﬁxed-price contract specifying quantity q1:( p,q = q1). Under this
32contract, if the seller invests, the parties negotiate to q2, and hence the seller’s payoﬀ is
p − c(q1)+α(φ1(q2) − φ1(q1))− d. If the seller does not invest, they cancel the contract and
the seller’s payoﬀ is p − c(q1)+α(m0 − φ0(q1)). The seller chooses to invest if
α(φ1 − m0) − α(φ1(q1) − φ0(q1)) ≥ d (21)
w h i c hi sr e w r i t t e na s
(ρ+
1 − ρ+
0 ) − (ρ1(q1) − ρ0(q1)) ≥ d. (22)
By (20) and (22), ﬁxed-price contracts cannot improve investment incentives if ρ1(q1) ≥
ρ0(q1)o rα(φ1(q1) − φ0(q1)) ≥− (1 − α)Δm. However, if
α(φ1(q1) − φ0(q1)) < −(1 − α)Δm (23)
holds, ﬁxed-price contracts may be of value. For example, suppose that the threat-point
eﬀect is negative (Δm < 0) and α(φ1 − m0)s a t i s ﬁ e sd − Δm >α (φ1 − m0) >d .T h e n i f
φ1(q1)−φ0(q1) > 0 is suﬃciently close to zero, (21) holds, and there is a ﬁxed-price contract
implementing investment.




0 )=d − Δm − α(φ1 − m1), (24)
similar to the one in the previous model. The reneging temptation under a ﬁxed-price contract
(p,q = q2) is also similar and equal to
d + α(m0 − φ0). (25)
The reneging temptation under a ﬁxed-price contract (p,q = q1) is derived as follows.
The buyer and the seller agree to cancel the contract and trade q2 with the buyer’s payment
b1 if the seller invests, and not to trade with the buyer’s payment b0 if the seller does not
invest. The payoﬀs are v1(q2)−b1 and b1 −c(q2) for the buyer and the seller, respectively, if
a =1 ,a n d−b0 and b0 + m0 if a = 0. The seller’s incentive compatibility constraint is hence
b1 − c(q2) − b0 − m0 ≥ d.
When the seller chooses a = 1, the buyer can deviate by not paying b1 but negotiating
transfer. The gain in her payoﬀ is then
v1(q1) − p +( 1− α)(φ1 − φ1(q1)) − (v1(q2) − b1)
= b1 − p +( 1− α)(φ1 − φ1(q1)).
33When the seller chooses a = 0, he can refuse to cancel the contract and instead negotiate a
transfer. The gain in his payoﬀ is then
p − c(q1)+α(m0 − φ0(q1)) − (b0 + m0)
= −b0 + p − c(q1)+α(m0 − φ0(q1)).
Summing up these gains and using the seller’s incentive compatibility constraint yields the
reneging temptation as follows.
d − α(φ1 − m0)+α(φ1(q1) − φ0(q1)). (26)
By comparing (25) and (26) we ﬁnd that the reneging temptation is at least as high under
a ﬁxed-price contract (p,q = q2) than under (p,q = q1), using (15). A ﬁxed-price contract is
thus of value if (26) is smaller than (24), which condition is written as follows:
α(φ1 − m0) − α(φ1(q1) − φ0(q1)) ≥ ρ1 − m0 = ρ+
1 − ρ+
0 . (27)
Now ﬁrst suppose ρ1(q1) ≥ ρ0(q1)o re q u i v a l e n t l yα(φ1(q1) − φ0(q1)) ≥− (1 − α)Δm.
Fixed-price contracts are then of no value under spot transactions. However, since d>
ρ+
1 − ρ+
0 holds and the left-hand side of (27) is smaller than d, there is a range of parameter
values in which (27) is satisﬁed, and hence a ﬁxed-price contract is valuable under repeated
transactions. Next suppose ρ1(q1) <ρ 0(q1). Fixed-price contracts are valuable even under
spot transactions if (21) holds. However, since the right-hand side of (27) is smaller than
that of (21), a ﬁxed-price contract is valuable in a broader range of parameter values under
repeated transactions than spot transactions.
In summary, our main assertion that repeated transactions, along with the negative
threat-point eﬀect, contributes crucially to the value of formal contracting turns out to be
valid for the case of multiple quantities.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper has oﬀered a new perspective on the role that formal contracts can play in
resolving or mitigating the holdup problem. In situations where no formal contract is valu-
able under spot transactions due to the purely cooperative nature of the relation-speciﬁc
investment, we have shown that writing a simple ﬁxed-price contract can be valuable under
repeated transactions. In our model, there is a range of parameter values in which a formal
ﬁxed-price contract combined with an informal agreement of either discretionary payments
34or termination of trade can help resolve or mitigate the holdup problem, whereas there is
another range of parameter values in which not writing a formal ﬁxed-price contract but
entirely relying on an informal agreement increases the total surplus of the buyer and the
seller.
Furthermore, we have shown that under an additional natural assumption, more complex
formal contracts contingent upon messages cannot provide higher investment incentives than
an appropriate simple ﬁxed-price contract and hence conﬁning our attention to ﬁxed-price
contracts as a form of formal contracts is without loss of generality. The key driving force
of our result is a possibility that relation-speciﬁc investment decreases the surplus under no
trade, that is, the threat-point eﬀect is negative. This possibility, although very plausible,
has been largely ignored in previous theoretical/empirical analyses of the holdup problem
under repeated transactions. Our ﬁndings suggest that independent variables capturing the
threat-point eﬀect be incorporated in future empirical studies on formal contracts and the
holdup problem.
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40Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2
In the main text we have shown that the seller’s incentive compatibility constraints (3) and
the self-enforcing condition (6) are necessary and suﬃcient for ˆ a to be implemented:








(π(ˆ a) − π)( 6 )
Necessity Suppose ˆ a>a o can be implemented: There exists a compensation plan (b(a,θ))a∈A,θ∈Θ








{b(ˆ a,θ) − e(ˆ a,θ)ρ(ˆ a,θ)}−min
θ
{b(ao,θ) − e(ao,θ)ρ(ao,θ)}
≥ E[b(ˆ a,θ) − e(ˆ a,θ)ρ(ˆ a,θ)] − E[b(ao,θ) − e(ao,θ)ρ(ao,θ)]
≥ ˆ a − ao − E[(1 − e(ˆ a,θ))m(ˆ a,θ)] + E[(1 − e(ao,θ))m(ao,θ)]
− E[e(ˆ a,θ)ρ(ˆ a,θ)] + E[e(ao,θ)ρ(ao,θ)]
=ˆ a − ao − E[ρ+(ˆ a,θ) − ρ+(ao,θ)]
This is the left-hand side of (DE-NC), by Δ+(ˆ a,ao) ≡ E[ρ+(ˆ a,θ) − ρ+(ao,θ)].
Suﬃciency Supposing (DE-NC), we construct a compensation plan that satisﬁes (3) and
(6). Deﬁne b(a,θ) as follows:28
b(ˆ a,θ)=e(ˆ a,θ)ρ(ˆ a,θ) − Δ+(ˆ a,ao)+ˆ a − ao
b(a,θ)=e(a,θ)ρ(a,θ), for all a  =ˆ a
(A1)
(3) is satisﬁed for a = ao:
E[b(ˆ a,θ)] + E[(1 − e(ˆ a,θ))m(ˆ a,θ)] − E[b(ao,θ)] − E[(1 − e(ao,θ))m(ao,θ)]
= E[ρ+(ˆ a,θ)] − Δ+(ˆ a,ao)+ˆ a − ao − E[ρ+(ao,θ)]
=ˆ a − ao
28The ﬁxed payment w is only used to guarantee that (4), (5), and the participation constraints are satisﬁed.
41For a  = ao, (3) holds because
E[b(ˆ a,θ)] + E[(1 − e(ˆ a,θ))m(ˆ a,θ)] − E[b(a,θ)] − E[(1 − e(a,θ))m(a,θ)]
=ˆ a − ao + E[b(ao,θ)] + E[(1 − e(ao,θ))m(ao,θ)] − E[b(a,θ)] − E[(1 − e(a,θ))m(a,θ)]
=ˆ a − ao +Δ +(ao,a)
≥ ˆ a − ao + ao − a =ˆ a − a




{b(a,θ) − e(a,θ)ρ(a,θ)} =m a x
θ
{b(ˆ a,θ) − e(ˆ a,θ)ρ(ˆ a,θ)}. (A2)
First, b(ˆ a,θ) − e(ˆ a,θ)ρ(ˆ a,θ)=Δ +(ao,ˆ a)+ˆ a − ao ≥ 0 holds by (7). And for a  =ˆ a, b(a,θ) −
e(a,θ)ρ(a,θ) = 0, and hence we obtain (A2). Similarly, we can show
min
a,θ









=ˆ a − ao − Δ+(ˆ a,ao)
which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3
As shown in the main text, the seller’s incentive compatibility constraints (8) and the self-
enforcing condition (11) are necessary and suﬃcient for ˆ a to be implemented:
E[b(ˆ a,θ)+e(ˆ a,θ)p +( 1− e(ˆ a,θ))m(ˆ a,θ)] − ˆ a




{b(a,θ)+( 1− e(a,θ))(ρ(a,θ) − p)}−min
a,θ




(π(ˆ a) − π)
(11)
42Necessity The left-hand side of (11) is rewritten as follows:
max
a,θ
{b(a,θ)+( 1− e(a,θ))(ρ(a,θ) − p)}−min
a,θ
{b(a,θ)+( 1− e(a,θ))(ρ(a,θ) − p)}
≥ max
θ
{b(ˆ a,θ)+( 1− e(ˆ a,θ))(ρ(ˆ a,θ) − p)}
− min
θ
{b(a,θ)+( 1− e(a,θ))(ρ(a,θ) − p)}
≥ E[b(ˆ a,θ)+( 1− e(ˆ a,θ))(ρ(ˆ a,θ) − p)] − E[b(a,θ)+( 1− e(a,θ))(ρ(a,θ) − p)]
≥ ˆ a − a − E[e(ˆ a,θ)p +( 1− e(ˆ a,θ))(m(ˆ a,θ)+p − ρ(ˆ a,θ))]
+ E[e(a,θ)p +( 1− e(a,θ))(m(a,θ)+p − ρ(a,θ))]
=ˆ a − a − E[ρ−(ˆ a,θ) − ρ−(a,θ)].
This is the left-hand side of (DE-FP) by Δ−(ˆ a,a)=E[ρ−(ˆ a,θ) − ρ−(a,θ)].
Suﬃciency To show the suﬃciency part, deﬁne b(a,θ) as follows:
b(ˆ a,θ)=ˆ a − a − (1 − e(ˆ a,θ))(ρ(ˆ a,θ) − p) − E[ρ−(ˆ a,θ)]
b(a,θ)=−(1 − e(a,θ))(ρ(a,θ) − p) − E[ρ−(a,θ)] for all a  =ˆ a
Then the incentive compatibility constraints (8) are satisﬁed:
E[b(ˆ a,θ)] + E[e(ˆ a,θ)p]+E[(1 − e(ˆ a,θ))m(ˆ a,θ)]
− E[b(a,θ)] − E[e(a,θ)p] − E[(1 − e(a,θ))m(a,θ)]
=ˆ a − a ≥ ˆ a − a for all a  =ˆ a
We next show the following:
max
a,θ
{b(a,θ)+( 1− e(a,θ))(ρ(a,θ) − p)} =ˆ a − a − E[ρ−(ˆ a,θ)]
min
a,θ
{b(a,θ)+( 1− e(a,θ))(ρ(a,θ) − p)} = −E[ρ−(a,θ)]
First, for a =ˆ a,
b(ˆ a,θ)+( 1− e(ˆ a,θ)(ρ(ˆ a,θ) − p)=ˆ a − a − E[ρ−(ˆ a,θ)]
holds for all θ. Second, for a  =ˆ a,
b(a,θ)+( 1− e(a,θ))(ρ(a,θ) − p)=−E[ρ−(a,θ)] ≥− E[ρ−(a,θ)]
43holds for all θ since a is the minimum level of investment and ρ−(a,θ) is decreasing in a.
Finally, ˆ a − a − E[ρ−(ˆ a,θ)] + E[ρ−(a,θ)] > 0 is satisﬁed. Therefore,
max
a,θ
{b(a,θ)+( 1− e(a,θ))(ρ(a,θ) − p)}−min
a,θ
{b(a,θ)+( 1− e(a,θ))(ρ(a,θ) − p)}
=ˆ a − a − E[ρ−(ˆ a,θ) − ρ−(a,θ)]
holds, which completes the proof.
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